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THE IMPACT OF NEGOTIATOR STYLES ON
BARGAINING INTERACTIONS 1
35 AMER. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 1 (2011)
By Charles B. Craver 2
I.

INTRODUCTION
When attorneys negotiate with one another, most exhibit a Cooperative/Problem-

Solving or Competitive/Adversarial approach. 3 Cooperative/Problem-Solvers usually
employ a problem-solving approach designed to generate mutually beneficial
agreements, 4 while Competitive/Adversarials use a more adversarial style that is intended
to generate more one-sided results. 5 Opposite traits can be attributed to these different
styles.
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Try to Maximize Joint Returns
Strive for Reasonable Results
Courteous and Sincere
Begin with Realistic Opening
Positions
Rely on Objective Standards
Rarely Resort to Threats
Maximize Information Disclosure
Open and Trusting
Work to Satisfy Underlying
Opponent Interests
Willing to Make Unilateral
Concessions
Try to Reason with Opponents

Try to Maximize Own Returns
Strive for Extreme Results
Adversarial and Disingenuous
Begin with Unrealistic Opening
Positions
Focus on Positions Rather than
Neutral Standards
Frequently Resort to Threats
Minimize Information Disclosure
Closed and Untrusting
Work to Satisfy Underlying
Interests of Own Side
Work to Induce Opponent to Make
Unilateral Concessions
Try to Manipulate Opponents

Cooperative/Problem-Solvers usually commence interactions with realistic
positions that are likely to generate positive bargaining environments. 6 They behave in a
courteous and professional manner that is designed to create harmonious relationships.
They are quite open with respect to their important information, and they work to explore
the underlying interests of both sides to enable them to ascertain and expand the overall
pie to be divided by the negotiating parties. This approach enables them to achieve
efficient agreements that maximize the joint gains obtained by the interactants. They try
to rely upon objective criteria to guide the discussions, to enable the bargainers to reach
fair, win-win agreements. Cooperative/Problem-Solvers rarely employ threats or other
disruptive tactics, preferring to rely upon cooperative strategies that are designed to
generate reciprocal movement.
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See LAURENCE J. BOULLE, MICHAEL T. COLATRELLA JR. & ANTHONY P.
PICCHIONI, MEDIATION SKILLS AND TECHNIQUES 158-159 (2008); ROY J.
LEWICKI & ALEXANDER HIAM, MASTERING BUSINESS NEGOTIATION 127156 (2006).
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Competitive/Adversarials usually commence their interactions with more extreme
positions that are employed to intimidate their adversaries. 7 They endeavor to attain onesided accords favoring their own side. They often resort to threats or other disruptive
techniques in an effort to keep their adversaries on the defensive. They try not to disclose
their negative information, and embellish their positive information to enable them to
convince opponents that they possess greater strength than they actually possess. They
work to induce adversaries to bid against themselves through the inadvertent articulation
of unreciprocated concessions. When Competitive/Adversarials believe it will advance
their own interests, they employ rude and unprofessional behavior.
This article will initially assess the relative effectiveness of the
Cooperative/Problem-Solving and Competitive/Adversarial styles. Which approach is
likely to generate optimal individual results and optimal joint results? How should
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers interact with Competitive/Adversarials to avoid
exploitation by such manipulative opponents? It will then consider a hybrid approach
which incorporates the most effective characteristics of both styles in an effort to
generate mutually beneficial accords which tend to favor one side more than the other.
II.

RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF COOPERATIVE/PROBLEM-SOLVING
AND COMPETITIVE/ADVERSARIAL STYLES
An increasing number of lawyers seem to believe that Competitive/Adversarial

negotiators who employ deceptive, aggressive, and occasionally abrasive tactics are more
likely to achieve beneficial results for their own side than Cooperative/Problem-Solving
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See BOULLE, COLATRELLA & PICCHIONI, supra note 6, at 152-153; LEWICKI &
HIAM, supra note 6, at 73-91.
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bargainers. I have observed this phenomenon both when I mediate employment law
disputes and when I talk with attorneys at my continuing legal education courses on
negotiating. When I was in practice thirty-five years ago in San Francisco, I almost never
encountered a rude or unprofessional opponent. Although both sides sought to obtain
agreements that were favorable to their respective clients, we did so in a courteous and
professional way. As a society in general and a profession in particular, we are no longer
as polite to one another. Lawyers frequently tell me about extremely rude adversaries,
and I occasionally encounter such persons when I mediate. This approach is entirely
contrary to the way in which people behave. When individuals are insulting, we want to
reject their entreaties to avoid rewarding them for their improper conduct. On the other
hand, when persons are kind and respectful, we feel guilty if refuse to provide them with
what they are seeking.
The thought that Competitive/Adversarial negotiators are more effective than
Cooperative/Problem-Solver bargainers was contradicted by separate empirical studies
conducted by Professors Gerald Williams and Andrea Schneider. Professor Williams
conducted his study of lawyers in Phoenix in 1976. 8 He asked respondents to indicate
whether attorneys with whom they had recently interacted were Cooperative/ProblemSolvers or Competitive/Adversarials. He found that 65 percent were classified as
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers, 24 percent as Competitive/Adversarials, and 11 percent
did not fit within either category. 9 The respondents also indicated that they considered the
results achieved by effective Cooperative/Problem-Solvers to be as beneficial for their
8

See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 3.
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See id. at 19.
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clients as the results attained by effective Competitive/Adversarials. 10 Nonetheless, he
found that far fewer Competitive/Adversarial negotiators were considered effective vis-àvis Cooperative/Problem-Solvers.
Professor Williams asked the respondents to indicate whether the persons they
had described were “effective,” “average,” or “ineffective” negotiators. Fifty-nine percent
of Cooperative/problem-Solvers were considered to be “effective,” 38 percent were
considered to be “average,” and only 3 percent were considered to be “ineffective.” 11 On
the other hand, only 25 percent of Competitive/Adversarials were considered to be
“effective,” 42 percent were considered to be “average,” and 33 percent were considered
to be “ineffective.”
In 1999, Professor Schneider replicated the Williams study with lawyers in
Chicago and Milwaukee. 12 Her respondents characterized 64 percent of their opponents
as Cooperative/Problem-Solvers and 36 percent as Competitive/Adversarials. 13 She also
asked whether these persons were “effective,” “average,” or “ineffective” negotiators.
She found that 54 percent of Cooperative/problem-Solvers were considered to be
“effective,” 42 percent were considered to be “average,” and 4 percent were considered
to be “ineffective.” 14 On the other hand, only 9 percent of Competitive/Adversarials were
considered to be “effective,” 37 percent were considered to be “average,” and 53 percent
10

See id. at 41.
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See id. at 19.
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See generally Schneider, supra note 3.
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See id. at 163.
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See id. at 167.
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were considered to be “ineffective.” Although the ratings for Cooperative/ProblemSolvers did not change much from the Williams study, the ratings for
Competitive/Adversarials changed significantly. The percentage of “effective”
Competitive/Adversarials dropped from 25 percent in the Williams study to 9 percent in
the Schneider study, and the percentage of “ineffective” Competitive/Adversarials
increased from 33 percent in the Williams study to 53 percent in the Schneider study.
These changes are not surprising when one considers the fact that the adjectives used to
describe Competitive/Adversarial bargainers were more negative in the Schneider study
than in the Williams study. 15
In the thirty-five years I have taught Legal Negotiating, I have not found
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers to be less effective negotiators than Competitive/
Adversarials. The idea that persons must be uncooperative, manipulative, and
intimidating to achieve beneficial results is incorrect. Bargainers only have to have the
ability to say “no” with conviction to be able to attain good results. Proficient individuals
can accomplish their objectives courteously and professionally, and be as effective as
those who behave more demonstrably. I have only noticed three significant differences
with respect to the outcomes achieved by Cooperative/Problem-Solver and Competitive/
Adversarial negotiators. First, when one-sided accords are reached, the prevailing party is
almost always a Competitive/Adversarial bargainer. This reflects the fact that
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers tend to be fair minded individuals who hesitate to take
undue advantage of inept adversaries. Second, Competitive/Adversarials generate more

15

Compare Schneider, supra note 3, at 172 Tbl. 20, with WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at
26-27.
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nonsettlements than Cooperative/Problem-Solvers. The inability of such persons to
achieve accords is caused by their frequent use of manipulative and disruptive tactics
which induce their opponents to more readily accept the consequences associated with
nonsettlements.
The third factor concerns the fact that Cooperative/Problem-Solvers usually
achieve more efficient combined results than Competitive/Adversarials. This
phenomenon is due primarily to the fact that Cooperative/Problem-Solvers are open and
trusting negotiators who strive to generate mutually beneficial agreements that maximize
the joint returns attained. Individuals who hope to reach highly efficient agreements must
be willing to work with their adversaries to determine areas for possible joint gains and to
exploit those opportunities. Even when they endeavor to obtain terms beneficial to their
own clients, they appreciate the fact that by expanding the overall pie to be shared they
increase the likelihood of obtaining the results they desire.
How can lawyers who seek to employ the Cooperative/Problem-Solving approach
increase the likelihood of interacting with like-minded negotiators? They can join the
Collaborative Law or the Cooperative Law movement. The Collaborative Law approach
began in the early 1990s by family law practitioners who wished to minimize the
adversarial nature of their negotiations. 16 Attorneys who join these groups commit

16

See generally NANCY J. CAMERON, COLLABORATIVE LAW PRACTICE
DEEPENING THE DIALOGUE (2004); SHEILA M. GUTTERMAN,
COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2004);
PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE
RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION (2001); PAULINE H.
TESSLER & PEGGY THOMPSON, COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: THE
REVOLUTIONARY NEW WAY TO RESTRUCTURE YOUR FAMILY, RESOLVE
LEGAL ISSUES, AND MOVE ON WITH YOUR LIFE (2006); STUART G. WEBB &
RON D. OUSKY, THE COLLABORATIVE WAY TO DIVORCE: THE
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themselves and their clients to entirely open and cooperative interactions. They promise
to be forthright and direct, and to avoid bluffing, puffing, or other value-claiming
behavior. The most controversial aspect of the Collaborative Law approach concerns a
provision requiring the selected legal representatives to withdraw from further
representation of their respective clients when amicable resolutions are not developed. If
these matters have to be litigated in court, the clients are required to obtain new counsel
to represent them.
To avoid potential conflicts between attorney desires and client interests that
might be generated by the disqualification provisions included in Collaborative Law
representation agreements, some lawyers have formed the Cooperative Law approach
which embodies the same disclosure and cooperative concepts associated with the
Collaborative Law movement, but which does not require counsel to withdraw if mutual
accords are not achieved. 17
Collaborative Law and Cooperative Law participants are attorneys who have
whole-heartedly embraced the Getting to Yes approach to negotiating. They are
uncomfortable with the deception and manipulation associated with traditional bargaining
interactions, and they wish to work with others who are completely forthright and
interested in the formulation of agreements that are mutually beneficial. They believe that
such cooperative exchanges most effectively protect the interests of their clients.
III.

CONFLICTING NEGOTIATOR STYLE INTERACTIONS

REVOLUTIONARY METHOD THAT RESULTS IN LESS STRESS, LOWER COSTS,
AND HAPPIER KIDS – WITHOUT GOING TO COURT (2006).
17

See generally John Lande, Practical Insights From an Empirical Study of Cooperative
Lawyers in Wisconsin, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 203 (2008).

9
When Cooperative/Problem-Solvers interact with other Cooperative/ProblemSolvers, their encounters are generally open and cooperative, 18 while interactions
between Competitive/Adversarials tend to be closed and manipulative. 19 When
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers interact with Competitive/Adversarials, their encounters
tend to be more competitive than cooperative. 20 The Cooperative/Problem-Solving
participants are compelled to behave in a more competitive fashion to avoid the
exploitation that would probably result if they were overly candid and accommodating
with their manipulative adversaries. Such cross-style encounters tend to generate less
efficient agreements and an increased number of impasses. 21 This factor may explain
why Professors Williams and Schneider found a far greater percentage of effective
Cooperative/Problem-Solver negotiators than Competitive/Adversarial negotiators.
When Competitive/Adversarial bargainers interact with Cooperative/ProblemSolver negotiators, the Competitive/Adversarial participants enjoy a clear advantage – if
their Cooperative/Problem-Solving opponents continue to operate in a naively
cooperative fashion. 22 Competitive/Adversarial individuals feel more comfortable in an
openly competitive setting than their Cooperative/Problem-Solving opponents who may
18

See HOWARD RAIFFA (WITH JOHN RICHARDSON & DAVID METCALFE),
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 288-291 (2003).

19

See id. at 298-301.

20

See Catherine H.Tinsley, Kathleen M. O’Connor & Brandon A. Sullivan, Tough Guys
Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive Reputation, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 621, 634-635 (2002).
21

22

See id. at 635.

See MICHAEL WATKINS, SHAPING THE GAME 78 (2006); LARRY L. TEPLEY,
LEGAL NEGOTIATION IN A NUT SHELL 59-60 (2d ed. 2005).
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be forced to behave in an uncharacteristically competitive manner to protect their own
interests. Cooperative/Problem-Solvers are likely to disclose more critical information
than Competitive/Adversarials, and they tend to seek less beneficial terms for themselves.
When Cooperative/Problem-Solvers commence interactions with persons they do
not know well, they should be cautious with respect to the confidential client information
they initially disclose. To protect themselves from exploitation by less open Competitive/
Adversarial opponents, they should initially disclose less critical information and see if
their candor is being reciprocated. If they are confident that their adversaries are being
equally open, they can continue to be forthcoming and work to jointly ascertain the
underlying interests of the parties. Such candor will enable them to have open discussions
that would be likely to maximize the joint returns generated. Nonetheless, if they suspect
that their initial openness is not being reciprocated, they must behave more strategically
and disclose less of their important information. Negotiators who fail to change their
behavior in this fashion will leave themselves open to exploitation by Competitive/
Adversarial opponents who use the information imbalance to obtain one-sided accords
favoring themselves.
IV.

THE COMPETITIVE/PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH
When Professor Williams conducted his study of Phoenix attorneys, he

discovered that certain traits are shared by both effective Cooperative/Problem-Solving
negotiators and effective Competitive/Adversarial bargainers. 23 They are thoroughly
prepared, conduct themselves in an honest and ethical manner, are perceptive readers of
opponent verbal leaks and nonverbal cues, are analytical, realistic, and convincing, and
23

See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 20-30.
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observe the customs and courtesies of the bar. He also found that skilled bargainers from
both groups desire to maximize their own side’s returns. Professor Schneider also found
this client maximizing objective among both effective Cooperative/Problem-Solving and
effective Competitive/Adversarial negotiators. 24 Since a desire to maximize one own
side’s returns is the quintessential characteristic associated with Competitive/Adversarial
negotiators, the discovery of this common trait among both effective
Cooperative/Problem-Solver and Competitive/Adversarial bargainers would indicate that
many persons who are characterized by their opponents as effective
Cooperative/Problem-Solving negotiators are actually wolves in sheepskin. They behave
as if they are employing an open and cooperative style, but they subtly work to obtain
competitive objectives. 25
Skilled negotiators are able to combine the most salient traits associated with the
Cooperative/Problem-Solving and the Competitive/Adversarial styles. 26 They work to
maximize the returns they obtain for their own clients, but they endeavor to accomplish

24

See Schneider, supra note 3, at 188.

25

See Hal Movius, The Effectiveness of Negotiation Training, 24 NEGOT. J. 509, 513515 (2008); Keith G. Allred, Distinguishing Best and Strategic Practices: A Framework
for Managing the Dilemma Between Creating and Claiming Value, 16 NEGOT. J. 387,
394-396 (2000).
26

See Robert J. Condlin, “Every Day and in Every Way We Are All Becoming Meta and
Meta”, or How Communitarian Bargaining Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining
Theory, 23 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 231, 298-299 (2008); Margaret A. Neale &
Allison R. Fragale, Social Cognition, Attribution, and Perception in Negotiation: The
Role of Uncertainty in Shaping Negotiation Processes and Outcomes in NEGOTIATION
THEORY AND RESEARCH 27, 32 (Leigh L. Thompson, ed.) (2006). See generally
Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining With a Hugger: The Weaknesses and Limitations of a
Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We Can’t All Just Get
Along, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2007).
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this objective in a courteous and seemingly cooperative manner. 27 They appreciate the
childhood admonition expressed by many parents that “you get more with honey than
you do with vinegar.” They also recognize the importance of expanding the overall pie to
be divided between the bargaining parties. Unlike less skilled bargainers who think of
negotiation interactions as “fixed pie” situations in which one side’s gain is the other
side’s corresponding loss, they understand that in multi-issue interactions the participants
usually value the various items quite differently. 28 Even when the principle issue is
money, the parties can agree to future payments or in-kind payments to generate more
efficient final agreements. Adroit negotiators appreciate the inherent tension between
“value creation” and “value claiming.” 29 Although they strive to claim more of the
distributive items desired by both sides, they look for integrative terms valued more by
one side than by the other in recognition of the fact that if these terms are resolved
efficiently, both sides will achieve better results. 30 They are quite open with respect to
underlying client interests to enable the interactants to look for areas of possible joint
gain, but they frequently over- or under-state the degree to which their clients actually
want the various items to enable them to obtain more of the joint surplus than they give to

27

See ROBERT D. MAYER, POWER PLAYS 7-8, 92 (1996).

28

See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO,
BEYOND WINNING 14-15, 174 (2000).
29

See Alex J. Hurder, The Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be or Not to Be a Problem-Solving
Negotiator, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 253, 271-279 (2007). See generally Charles B.
Craver, The Inherent Tension Between Value Creation and Value Claiming During
Bargaining Interactions, __ CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RES. __ (2010) (firthcoming).
30

See WATKINS, supra note 22, at 8-9; RONALD M. SHAPIRO & MARK A.
JANKOWSLI, THE POWER OF NICE 45-61 (2001).
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their opponents. If they think their adversaries really want several issues their side does
not value highly, they may exaggerate their interest in those terms to make it appear that
they are conceding more than they actually are. If their side really desires specific items
they believe the opposing party does not consider important, they may under-state their
actual interest in those terms to enable them to obtain them in exchange for less
significant concessions.
Competitive/Problem-Solvers recognize that if the parties maximize the way in
which the integrative terms are resolved, it is easier for them to claim more of the
distributive items. Although they may manipulate opponent perceptions with respect to
the degree to which they value particular terms, they do not employ truly deceitful
tactics. 31 They realize that a loss of credibility would seriously undermine their capacity
to obtain beneficial accords. Even though they hope to obtain a greater share of the joint
surplus, they are not “win-lose” Competitive/Adversarial negotiators. Nor are they the
“win-win” Cooperative/Problem-Solvers they appear to be. As Competitive/ProblemSolvers, they employ a hybrid style which Ronald Shapiro and Mark Jankowski
characterize as “WIN-win: big win for your side, little win for theirs.” 32 They understand

31

Although Model Rule 4.1 provides that it is unethical for an attorney to “make a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person,” Comment 2 expressly exempts
statements regarding the degree to which clients value the items being exchanged.
“Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed
on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a
claim are ordinarily in this category . . .” THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, 2008 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 92-93 (2008). See generally Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics
for Real World Interactions, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 299 (2010).
32

SHAPIRO & JANKOWSKI, supra note 30, at 5 (emphasis in original).
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that the imposition of poor terms on their adversaries does not necessarily benefit their
own clients. All other factors being equal, they wish to maximize opponent satisfaction,
as long as this does not require significant concessions with respect to terms valued by
their own side. 33 At the conclusion of bargaining encounters, they do not compare the
results they have achieved with those obtained by their adversaries. They instead ask
themselves whether their clients like what they received.
Competitive/Problem-Solvers appreciate the importance of negotiation process.
Studies indicate that persons who believe that the bargaining process has been fair and
they have been treated respectfully are more satisfied with objectively less beneficial
final terms than they are with objectively more beneficial terms achieved through a
process considered less fair and less respectful. 34 This explains why proficient
Competitive/Problem-Solvers always treat their adversaries with respect and act
professionally. They are also careful at the conclusion of interactions to leave opponents
with the feeling those persons obtained “fair” results.
Competitive/Problem-Solvers do not work to maximize opponent returns for
purely altruistic reasons. They appreciate the fact that such behavior most effectively
enhances their ability to advance their own interests. They understand that they must
offer their opponents sufficiently generous terms to induce those persons to accept the
agreements they are proposing. If they fail to propose accords within opponent settlement
33

See generally Leaf Van Boven & Leigh Thompson, A Look into the Mind of the
Negotiator: Mental Models in Negotiation, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP
RELS. 387 (2003).
34

See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation:
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW &
SOCIAL INQUIRY 473 (2008).
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ranges, no agreements will be achieved. They also want to be certain that adversaries will
honor the terms agreed upon. If opponents experience post-agreement “buyers remorse,”
they may refuse to effectuate those accords. The final consideration concerns the fact that
attorneys often interact with the same opponents in the future. If those individuals feel
that their current encounters have been pleasant and beneficial, they will look forward to
future interactions with those persons. 35
Why are Competitive/Problem-Solvers more able to obtain beneficial results for
their clients than Cooperative/Problem-Solvers or Competitive/Adversarials? They
appreciate the fact that true Cooperative/Problem-Solvers are too open and trusting.
Those negotiators are too quick to disclose their actual underlying interests and the
degree to which they value the different items to be exchanged. Such bargainers tend to
have modest aspirations, and their desire for true “win-win” results causes them to
generate efficient but personally modest agreements. Competitive/Adversarial bargainers
establish elevated aspirations and seek one-sided results favoring their own side, but they
frequently behave in an aggressive and adversarial manner. Such behavior turns off
cooperative opponents, and generates an excessive number of nonsettlements where
accords could have been achieved. It also produces less efficient terms when agreements
are reached.
Negotiators who employ the hybrid Competitive/Problem-Solving approach are
able to obtain optimal results for their clients by appearing to be entirely open and
cooperative, when they are actually being somewhat closed and manipulative. Keith
Allred found this approach to be highly effective when he conducted empirical studies of
35

See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, 3-D NEGOTIATION 17-18 (2006).
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the factors possessed by skilled negotiators. He conducted exercises used to ascertain the
degree to which adroit bargainers employ “strategic practices” designed to enable them to
claim more of joint surpluses for themselves and “integrating and accommodating
practices” designed to maximize the joint returns achieved. He discovered that the most
successful negotiators were individuals who were considered by their adversaries to use
primarily “integrating and accommodating practices,” even those these persons admitted
that they frequently employed “strategic practices” to advance their own interests. 36
The fact that many Competitive/Problem-Solver negotiators are considered by
their opponents to be conventional Cooperative/Problem-Solver bargainers may partially
explain why Professors Williams and Schneider found more effective Cooperative/
Problem-Solving negotiators than effective Competitive/Adversarial bargainers. It is
likely that many effective Competitive/Problem-Solving negotiators who subtly
employed competitive tactics were so successful in their use of seemingly cooperative
techniques, that they induced their opponents to characterize them as “cooperative” rather
than “competitive.”
Although many people seem to believe that Cooperative/Problem-Solving
negotiators generate more efficient agreements than individuals who may be subtly or
overtly competitive, an empirical study by Professors Kathleen O’Connor and Peter
Carnevale contradicts this assumption. 37 Their study concerned “common-value issues”
that both sides wished to have resolved in the same manner even though the participants
36

37

See Allred, supra note 25, at 394-395.

See Kathleen M. O’Connor & Peter J. Carnevale, A Nasty But Effective Negotiation
Strategy: Misrepresentation of a Common-Value Issue, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. BULLETIN 504 (1997).
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were not aware of their positional overlap. Some of the bargaining pairs were entirely
open and cooperative with respect to their interests, while other dyads included
negotiators who could be disingenuous with respect to their actual interests. O’Connor
and Carnevale found that the individualistically motivated pairs generated higher joint
outcomes than the cooperatively motivated pairs. This was apparently due to the fact the
individualistically motivated negotiators established higher overall objectives for
themselves than did the cooperatively motivated participants. The individualistically
motivated persons recognized that by generating the most efficient overall agreements
they increased the likelihood they would obtain optimal results for themselves.
The Competitive/Problem-Solving approach can be especially effective when
employed by Collaborative Law or Cooperative Law movement members. If these
manipulative negotiators can convince their colleagues that they are being completely
open and cooperative when they are not being entirely forthright and they subtly employ
distributive techniques to enable them to claim more of the joint surplus being generated,
they should be able to achieve terms that are more beneficial to their own clients than the
terms being obtained by their opponents.
When Collaborative Law, Cooperative Law, or other legal practitioners
commence bargaining interactions with individuals they do not know extremely well,
they should be circumspect. If the behavior of their opponents indicates that they are
competitive negotiators seeking to maximize their own results, these persons should be
less candid and more circumspect. If their adversaries begin with more extreme positions,
they should also articulate positions favoring their own clients. If they instead open with
positions close to where they really hope to end up, they will almost always obtain less

18
beneficial results. Parties tend to move from their opening positions toward the center,
and the parties beginning with more skewed opening offers or demands tend to obtain
skewed results favoring their own side.
As noted in Part III, naturally open negotiators should not be excessively open at
the commencement of interactions with others. They should expose some non-critical
information regarding their needs and interests and see if their candor is being
reciprocated. If it is, they can continue to cautiously disclose more information. If it is
not, however, they have to be less open. If one side is entirely open while the other side is
being less candid, an information imbalance is created which favors the less open
participant. If individuals think their adversaries are over- or under-stating the value of
different items for strategic purposes, they should not naively disclose their own true
needs and interests. Although they would be most effective if they similarly over- or
under-stated their own circumstances, some truly cooperative bargainers might not feel
comfortable with such manipulative tactics. Such persons could alternatively withhold –
rather than misrepresent – their true needs and interests, to avoid placing themselves and
their clients at a bargaining disadvantage.
Is it ethical for members of formal Collaborative Law or Cooperative Law
movements to employ the Competitive/Problem-Solving style when they interact with
other group members? I think that such a manipulative approach would be entirely
improper. Members of such groups have formally committed themselves and their clients
to complete disclosure and to cooperative conduct. The only way in which individuals
can be true to such undertakings is to employ the Cooperative/Problem-Solving approach.
When they withhold or even minimally distort client information or they seek to obtain

19
an inappropriately large portion of the joint surplus, they violate their group norms.
Nonetheless, Collaborative Law and Cooperative Law group members must appreciate
the possibility that some of their cohorts may actually employ the Competitive/ProblemSolving style in a fashion that may be undetectable by most of their opponents.
V.

CONCLUSION
Most negotiation books and courses divide lawyers into Cooperative/Problem-

Solving or Competitive/Adversarial groups. Cooperative/Problem-Solvers are open and
cooperative, and they work to generate mutually beneficial agreements. Competitive/
Adversarials are less open, more manipulative, and work to maximize their own side
returns. Studies conducted by Professors Williams and Schneider found that twice as
many attorneys are considered by their peers to be Cooperative/Problem-Solvers than
Competitive/Adversarials, and that far more Cooperative/ Problem-Solvers are
considered to be effective bargainers than Competitive/Adversarials.
When Cooperative/Problem-Solvers interact with Competitive/Adversarials, they
have to modify their behavior to avoid exploitation by such manipulative opponents.
They have to be less open and behave more strategically. If they are excessively candid
or begin with naively generous opening positions, they provide such adversaries with a
distinct bargaining advantage.
Many proficient negotiators employ a hybrid Competitive/Problem-Solving style.
They behave in a seemingly open and cooperative manner, but are not entirely open, and
they subtly employ manipulative techniques to obtain a greater share of the joint surplus
that is created. They behave in a courteous and professional manner, in recognition of the
fact that this increases the likelihood they will achieve their objectives. Although their
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opponents think they are behaving in a cooperative fashion, they admittedly employ
disingenuous tactics to advance their interests. Opponents who do not appreciate the
degree to which the Competitive/Problem-Solving style may be employed successfully
are likely to concede more to these adversaries than they should.

